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Abstract
This paper considers an original exchange property of set valua-
tions. This property is shown to be equivalent to a property described
in [3] in the context of discrete optimization and matroids and shown
there to characterize the valuations for which the demand oracle can
be implemented by a greedy algorithm. The same exchange property
is also equivalent to a property described independently in [19] and
in [15] and shown there to be satisfied by substitutes valuations. It
is also equivalent to an ultra-metric property of the complementarity
exhibited by a valuation. The paper then studies the family of valu-
ations that satisfy this exchange property, the ultra valuations. Any
substitutes valuation is an ultra valuation, but ultra valuations may
exhibit complementarities. Ultra valuations satisfy the law of aggre-
gate demand introduced in [11]. Any symmetric valuation is an ultra
valuation. Substitutes valuations are exactly the submodular ultra
valuations. Ultra valuations define ultrametrics on the set of items.
The maximum of an ultra valuation on n items can be found in O(n2)
steps.
Keywords: discrete optimization, combinatorial auctions, set valuations,
ultra valuations, gross substitutability, M ♮ valuations, greedy optimization,
well-layered maps
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1 Introduction
Two different streams of research: equilibrium theory in Economics and dis-
crete optimization in Applied Mathematics have considered closely related
families of set functions but used different languages, notations and auxiliary
assumptions common in their fields. They sometimes failed to realize that
the families they considered were essentially the same.
Kelso and Crawford [13] introduced the (gross) substitutes valuations in
order to model the work market. They showed that a market in which all
agents have substitutes valuations has a Walrasian equilibrium. Since then,
the study of substitutes valuations and of discrete markets amongst agents
exhibiting substitutes valuations have been intensively pursued, see in partic-
ular Bikhchandani and Mamer [1], Gul and Stacchetti [5] and Reijnierse, van
Gellekom and Potters [19]. In those works one mostly considers properties
of valuations under different item prices.
Applied mathematicians studied discrete convex optimization, matroids
and greedy algorithms, see in particular Jensen and Korte [12], Korte, Lova´sz
and Schrader [14], Dress and Terhalle [3] and Murota and Shioura [17]. In
those works one mostly considers exchange properties that do not involve
prices.
The connection between those two streams was noticed by Fujishige and
Yang [4] and Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan [15] who considered more general
families of valuations exhibiting no complementarity and extended some of
their results to valuations with limited complementarities. The algorithmic
aspects of the topic have been remarkably surveyed in [16] which also presents
original results.
The purpose of this paper is to present an original exchange property and
show that it is equivalent to a number of properties studied in [19, 3, 15, 2] and
that it implies the law of aggregate demand of [11]. Valuations that satisfy
this exchange property will be called ultra valuations, after one of those
equivalent properties, related to ultra-metrics and presented in Section 6
below.
This exchange property greatly facilitates the proof of all properties of
ultra valuations and in particular the fact that a greedy algorithm finds an
optimal bundle under any price vector. This greedy algorithm has been de-
scribed by Dress and Terhalle in [3] where the class of valuations for which it
finds a maximum is characterized by the exchange property in Definition 7
below. The authors did not relate their property with the substitutes prop-
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erty. This paper shows that the class of valuations that satisfy Dress and
Terhalle’s property is strictly larger than the class of substitutes valuations.
This greedy algorithm is not the one described in [16] and shown there to
characterize substitutes valuations. Our exchange property is also useful in
showing that substitutes valuations are exactly the submodular ultra val-
uations and in looking for a notion of equilibrium suitable for exchanges
in which agents exhibit ultra valuations. This allows for a characterization
of the substitutable choice functions of Hatfield and Milgrom’s [11] in Ap-
pendix D. In Milgram and Hatfield’s model the set of items has a structure:
the items are contracts between a hospital and a doctor. This structure is
used in a number of later works, including [7, 6, 8, 9, 10], where, for ex-
ample, items (contracts) which refer to the same doctor are given special
consideration. The many classes of valuations considered in those works use,
in their definition, this extra structure. Therefore they cannot be compared
with the classes of the present work which assumes that the set of items is
unstructured.
2 Basic notions and notations
We consider a finite set of items. We follow [5] and name this set Ω and let
n = | Ω |. A subset of Ω is a bundle. A valuation gives a real value to every
bundle: any real function v : 2Ω −→ R is a valuation. Note that we do not
require v to be monotonic, non-negative or that v(∅) be equal to 0.
In the sequel A, B, X , Y , . . . will always denote subsets of Ω, and a, b,
x, y, . . . will denote elements of Ω. The number of elements of A is denoted
| A |. The set A ∪ {x} will be denoted A+ x only when x 6∈ A and the
set A− {x} will be denoted A− x only when x ∈ A. The set A− x+ y
will denote (A− {x}) ∪ {y} only when x 6= y, x ∈ A and y 6∈ A. The set
{x} ∪ {y} will be denoted x+ y only when x 6= y. If X ⊆ Ω we shall denote
by vX the restriction of v to subsets of X defined by: vX(A) = v(A) for all
A ⊆ X . The marginal valuation defined by v given a bundle A ⊆ Ω, denoted
vA is a valuation on Ω− A defined by
vA(B) = v(A ∪ B)− v(A)
for any bundle B ⊆ Ω−A. For convenience, the expression v(x | y) will be
used to denote v{y}({x}) and vA(x | B) for (vA)B(x) = vA∪B(x). We shall
not use v(x | B | A).
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We shall now define a measure of the degree of complementarity between
two items. It will be a central technical tool in the sequel.
Definition 1 Let v be a valuation on Ω, A ⊆ Ω and let x, y ∈ Ω− A be
distinct items. The complementarity of x and y given A is defined as:
cA(x, y) = vA(x+ y)− vA(x)− vA(y).
Note that cA(y, x) = cA(x, y) and that if x and y are complementary in the
presence of A the quantity cA(x, y) is positive and that it is negative if x and
y are substitutes in the presence of A.
Definition 2 A valuation p : 2Ω → R is said to be additive iff f(∅) = 0 and
for any A,B ⊆ Ω one has p(A) + p(B) = p(A ∪ B) + p(A ∩B).
Often an additive valuation p presents a price structure in which every bundle
is valued at the sum of the prices of the items it contains.
Definition 3 If v is any valuation and p is an additive valuation, the val-
uation vp defined by vp(A) = v(A)− p(A) is the utility defined by v and
p.
3 Plan of this paper
In Section 4 an original exchange property, Exchange, that defines ultra
valuations is presented and some basic facts established. In order to show
immediately the relevance of this property to economics and auctions Sec-
tion 5 shows that any ultra valuation satisfies the law of aggregate demand
of [11]. Section 6 presents the main technical result of this paper. It de-
scribes the Ultra property and shows that it implies Exchange. The Ultra
property is inspired by [2]. Section 7 shows that properties, LLN and RGP,
respectively studied by [15] and [19] are trivially equivalent and implyUltra.
Section 8 shows that a property studied by [3] implies LLN and is implied
by Exchange. One concludes that all properties mentioned above are equiv-
alent. Section 9 provides examples of ultra valuations and Section 10 studies
some closure properties of the family. Section 11 characterizes substitutes
valuations as those ultra valuations that are submodular. The proof is an
interesting alternative to [19]’s proof. Section 12 studies, for ultra valua-
tions, the structure of preferred bundles, i.e., those bundles that maximize
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the valuation. Some of the properties put in evidence seem novel even for
substitutes valuations. Section 13 studies the changes in preferred bundles
caused by a change in the prices of items. Section 14 proposes some char-
acterizations of preferred bundles. Section 15 provides an alternative proof
to [3]’s result: ultra valuations are exactly those for which a greedy algorithm
finds a bundle of maximal value. Section 16 characterizes competitive (Wal-
rasian) equilibria among agents exhibiting ultra valuations and discusses the
kind of stability that can be expected when there is no competitive equi-
librium. Section 17 concludes this paper and discusses open problems and
future work. Appendices A, B and C contain technical lemmas used in the
proofs. Appendix D studies the relation between ultra valuations and the
substitutability property of [11] couched in choice-language.
4 Ultra valuations
Exchange properties are an important tool in discrete optimization and a
number of such properties have been considered in the literature, notably by
Dress and Terhalle in [3] (see Definition 7) and by Murota and Shioura in [17]
(see Definition 8). We shall now introduce an original exchange property.
This property can, without too much effort be shown to imply the former
and be implied by the latter. We shall show, with substantial effort, that it
is equivalent to the former and strictly weaker than the latter. Our exchange
property has no obvious intuitive meaning: one cannot, on first principles,
characterize the type of economic agents whose valuation satisfies it, but
neither is this the case for the properties just mentioned. Note that, in the
definition below, to any x ∈ A−B must correspond a y ∈ B − A, as in the
M ♮-concavity of [17].
Definition 4 Let Ω be a finite set and v : 2Ω → R be a valuation on Ω. The
valuation v is an ultra valuation iff for any A,B ⊆ Ω such that | A |≤| B |
and any x ∈ A− B there is some y ∈ B −A such that
Exchange v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A− x+ y) + v(B − y + x).
The reason for the term ultra will become clear in Section 6. A striking
feature of Exchange is the requirement that the size of the bundle A, from
which x will be taken contains is not greater than that of B. It may seem
odd that size should be a consideration. In Section 5 the reader will meet a
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property considered in [11], with a solid economic interpretation, that also
implies size considerations.
But, first, let us state some simple facts.
Lemma 1 If v is an ultra valuation then,
1. for any S ⊆ Ω the marginal valuation vS is also an ultra valuation, and
2. for any additive valuation p, the valuations v + p and v − p are ultra
valuations.
Proof: For the first claim, we have | A | ≤ | B | iff | A ∪ S | ≤ | B ∪ S |,
A− B = (A ∪ S)− (B ∪ S), and
vS(A) + vS(B) ≥ vS(A− x+ y) + vS(B − y + x) iff
v(A ∪ S) + v(B ∪ S) ≥ v(A ∪ S − x+ y) + v(B ∪ S − y + x).
Secondly, ∑
z∈A
pz +
∑
z∈B
pz =
∑
z∈A−x+y
pz +
∑
z∈B−y+z
pz.
5 The law of aggregate demand
In [11] Hatfield and Milgrom developed a general model that encompasses
many situations previously studied in the literature. They identified a com-
mon property of those many situations: the law of aggregate demand that,
informally, says that, if the set of possible choices is enlarged, the number of
items desired cannot decrease. They formulate their condition under the as-
sumption that, for any X ⊆ Ω there is a unique bundle maximizing v among
all subsets of X . Definition 5 reduces to their definition in such a case, but
treats properly the general case with ties.
Definition 5 A valuation v satisfies the law of aggregate demand iff for any
partition of the set of items Ω = X ∪ Y , X ∩ Y = ∅ and for any bundle
A ⊆ X that maximizes v among all subsets of X there is some bundle B ⊆ Ω
that maximizes v over all subsets of Ω such that | B | ≥ | A |.
Theorem 1 Any ultra valuation satisfies the law of aggregate demand.
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The converse does not hold.
Proof: Let v be an ultra valuation and let Ω = X ∪ {z} for z ∈ Ω−X .
Assume A ⊆ X maximizes v among all subsets of X . Let Q ⊆ Ω be any
bundle that maximizes v among all subsets of Ω. We want to prove that
there is some B ⊆ Ω such that v(B) = v(Q) and | B | ≥ | A |. Without loss
of generality we may assume that | Q |< | A | and also that v(Q) > v(A),
implying z ∈ Q− A. Exchange then implies that there is some y ∈ A−Q
such that
v(Q) + v(A) ≤ v(Q− z + y) + v(A− y + z).
But v(Q) ≥ v(A− y + z) since Q maximizes v over all subsets and v(A) ≥
v(Q− z + y) since Q− z + y ⊆ X . We conclude that v(Q) = v(A− y + z)
and we can take B = A− y + z. The proof is concluded by adding to X
the elements of Y one by one.
6 The Ultra property
The following originates in [2].
Definition 6 Let v be any valuation on Ω. If for any A ⊆ Ω and any pair-
wise distinct x, y, z ∈ Ω−A such that cA(x, y) > cA(x, z) one has cA(y, z) =
cA(x, y), we shall say that v satisfies the Ultra property.
The property Ultra is the characteristic property of ultra-metrics: all tri-
angles are isoceles and the equal sides are the longer ones. This makes cA
almost an ultra-metric, but notice that cA(x, y) may be negative.
Lemma 2 is the hard core of this paper.
Lemma 2 If v satisfies the Ultra property then v is an ultra valuation, i.e.,
it satisfies the Exchange property.
In Theorem 2 we shall conclude that the converse holds: Exchange implies
Ultra and this is much easier to prove.
Proof: We shall rely on a number of lemmas the proof of which appears
in Appendix A. Assume v satisfies Ultra. Let A,B ⊆ Ω, | A | ≤ | B | and
x ∈ A− B. Let X = A ∩B. Note that X may well be empty, in this case
vX = v. Our goal is equivalent to showing that there is some y ∈ B − A
such that
vX(A−B) + vX(B − A) ≤ vX(A− B − x+ y) + vX(B − A− y + x).
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But, now, (A−B) ∩ (B − A) = ∅ and Lemma 6 shows that vX satisfies
Ultra. It is therefore enough for us to show that Exchange holds when
A ∩ B = ∅. We assume A ∩B = ∅.
We shall prove our claim by induction on the size of A. Since x ∈ A this
set is not empty and our base case is | A |= 1, i.e., A = {x}. Since | A | ≤
| B |, B 6= ∅. We want to show that there is some y ∈ B such that
v(x) + v(B) ≤ v(y) + v(B − y + x).
This is proved in Lemma 8, in Appendix A.
Suppose now that Exchange (for A ∩B = ∅) holds if | A | ≤ n− 1
(n ≥ 2) and assume | A |= n. Let w be any element of A− x and let z be
the element of B that maximizes the quantity v(B − z′ + w)− v(B − z′ + x)
over all z′ ∈ B. By the induction hypothesis there is some y ∈ B − z such
that
vw(A− w) + vw(B − z) ≤ vw(A− w − x+ y) + vw(B − z − y + x). (1)
We have
v(A) + v(B − z + w) ≤ v(A− x+ y) + v(B − z − y + w + x). (2)
Let X = B − y − z By Lemma 9 and Lemma 6, in Appendix A,
vX(y+z)+vX(w+x) ≤ max(vX(x+y)+vX(w+z), vX(w+y)+vX(x+z)).
and therefore
v(B) + v(B − y − z + w + x) ≤
max(v(B − z + x) + v(B − y + w), v(B − z + w) + v(B − y + x)).
By the choice of z we have
v(B − z + w)− v(B − z + x) ≥ v(B − y + w)− v(B − y + x)
and therefore
v(B) + v(B − y − z + w + x) ≤ v(B − y + x) + v(B − z + w). (3)
Now, by Equations (1) and (3):
v(A) + v(B) = v(A) + v(B − z + w) + v(B)− v(B − z + w) ≤
v(A−x+ y)+ v(B− y− z+w+x)+ v(B− y+x)− v(B− y− z+w+x) =
v(A− x+ y) + v(B − y + x).
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7 Two more characteristic properties
We shall now introduce two more properties that will be shown to be equiva-
lent to Exchange and Ultra in Theorem 2. Both are named by the initials
of the authors of the articles in which they were presented. The following is
obvious from the definition of marginal valuations.
Lemma 3 The two following properties of a valuation v on Ω are equivalent:
1. LLN for any S ⊆ Ω and for any pairwise distinct x, y, z ∈ Ω− S
vS(z | x) > vS(z | y) ⇒ vS(x | y) ≥ vS(x | z),
2. RGP for any S ⊆ Ω and for any pairwise distinct x, y, z ∈ Ω− S
vS(x+ y) + vS(z) ≤ max(vS(x+ z) + vS(y), vS(y + z) + vS(x)).
Property LLN was proved to be satisfied by substitutes valuations in [15]
(Claim 1 and Lemma 4) and used to show that substitutes valuations have
measure zero in the set of all valuations. Property RGP was described
in [19] (Theorem 10). The authors show that substitutes valuations are
exactly those submodular valuations that satisfy RGP.
Lemma 4 Any valuation v that satisfies LLN satisfies Ultra.
Proof: Assume cA(x, y) > cA(x, z). We have vA(x+ y)− vA(x)− vA(y) >
vA(x+ z)− vA(x)− vA(z) and vA(x | y) > vA(x | z). LLN, then implies
vA(y | z) ≥ vA(y | x), and therefore vA(y + z)− vA(z) ≥ vA(x+ y)− vA(x),
i.e., cA(y, z) ≥ cA(x, y).
But if we had cA(y, z) > cA(x, y), by the reasoning just above, exchang-
ing x and y, we would conclude that cA(x, z) ≥ cA(x, y), contradicting our
assumption. Therefore cA(y, z) = cA(x, y).
8 A third characteristic property
We shall now discuss an additional property, also named after its inventors.
Theorem 2 will show that it is also equivalent to Exchange.
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Definition 7 Let v be any valuation on Ω. If, for any S ⊆ Ω, any T ⊆ Ω− S,
| T | ≥ 3 and any x ∈ T there is some y ∈ T , y 6= x such that
DT v(S + x) + v(S + T − x) ≤ v(S + y) + v(S + T − y)
we shall say that v satisfies the property DT.
Property DT was shown in [3] (Theorem 3) to be a characteristic property
of those valuations for which a bundle of maximal value can be found by a
greedy algorithm. The present work shows that these valuations are exactly
the ultra valuations.
Lemma 5 The property DT implies LLN and is implied by Exchange.
Proof: Property RGP is exactly property DT when | T |= 3. Therefore
we may conclude by Lemma 3 that DT implies LLN. Property DT fol-
lows from Exchange by taking A = S + x and B = S + T − x and noticing
that | S + x | ≤ | S + T − x | since T contains at least three items. In fact
| S + x |< | S + T − x |.
We conclude that all the properties considered so far are equivalent.
Theorem 2 Properties Exchange, Ultra, LLN, RGP and DT are equiv-
alent.
Proof: By Lemmas 2, 3, 4 and 5.
9 Examples of ultra valuations
Theorem 10 of [19] shows that substitutes valuations satisfy RGP and, in-
dependently, Claim 1 and Lemma 4 of [15] show that substitutes valuations
satisfy LLN, therefore any substitutes valuation is an ultra valuation, but
not all ultra valuations are substitutes and we shall present two examples of
families of ultra valuations that exhibit complementarities. But, before that,
note that the LLN property shows that ultra valuations lie in the union of
three hyperplanes in the 2n dimensional Euclidean space and have therefore
measure zero, as proved in Theorem 7 of [15]. Therefore, the set of ultra
valuations is, in a sense, small.
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9.1 Symmetric valuations
One easily sees that any symmetric valuation v, i.e., v(A) depends only on
| A | is an ultra valuation. Symmetric valuations may exhibit complemen-
tarities. If n = | Ω | a symmetric valuation is defined by n + 1 parameters,
v0, v1, . . . , vn where v(A) = vi for any bundle A of size i. But a larger
family of ultra valuations whose elements are defined by 2n parameters can
be considered by giving possibly a different value to each singleton. For
the parameters v0, v2, . . . , vn and vx for every x ∈ Ω, let v
1 = 0 and define
v(A) =
∑
x∈A vx + v
k for any A ⊆ Ω, where k = | A |. One easily sees that
vA(x | y) = vx + v
k+2 − vk+1 = vA(x | z).
9.2 Left and Right
Now, we shall present an interesting family of ultra valuations, formalizing
the paradigmatic example of complementarities: left and right shoes. Let
Ω = L ∪ R with L ∩R = ∅. Define pairs(X) = min(| X ∩ L |, | X ∩R |),
i.e., the number of pairs (a, b), with a ∈ L and b ∈ R that one can obtain from
X . Let v(X) = f(pairs(X)) for any strictly increasing concave function
f : {0, . . . , n} → R, i.e., x ≥ y iff f(x) ≥ f(y) and f(m) ≥ f(m−1)+f(m+1)
2
.
We claim that v is an ultra valuation. We shall show that v satisfies the
Ultra property. Let A ⊆ Ω and let x, y, z ∈ Ω− A be pairwise distinct. Note
that vA(x) ≥ vA(y) if and only if f(pairs(A+ x)) ≥ f(pairs(A+ y)), i.e.,
pairs(A+ x) ≥ pairs(A+ y). If all three items x, y and z are of the same
type (L or R), then vA(x) = vA(y) = vA(z) and vA(x+ y) = vA(x+ z) =
vA(y + z) and therefore one has cA(x, y) = cA(x, z) = cA(y, z), satisfying
Ultra. Otherwise two items are of the same type and the third one is of the
opposite type. Without loss of generality, assume x and y are of the same
type and z is of the opposite type. We have vA(x) = vA(y) and vA(x+ z) =
vA(y + z). Therefore cA(x, z) = cA(y, z). To show that Ultra is satisfied we
must show that cA(x, z) ≥ cA(x, y), i.e.,
v(A+ x+ z)− v(A)− v(A+ x) + v(A)− v(A+ z) + v(A) ≥
v(A+ x+ z)− v(A)− v(A+ x) + v(A)− v(A+ y) + v(A),
i.e.,
v(A+ x+ z)− v(A+ z) ≥ v(A+ x+ y)− v(A+ y).
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If A is balanced, i.e., | A ∩ L |= | A ∩ R | then
pairs(A) = pairs(A+ y) = pairs(A+ z) = pairs(A+ x+ y)
and
pairs(A) + 1 = pairs(A+ x+ z).
Therefore
f(pairs(A+x+z))−f(pairs(A+z)) > f(pairs(A+x+y))−f(pairs(A+y))
and we conclude that indeed v(A+ x+ z)− v(A+ z) ≥ v(A+ x+ y)− v(A+ y).
If A has more items of the type of x (and y) than items of the type of z
pairs(A) = pairs(A+ y) = pairs(A+ x+ y)
and
pairs(A) + 1 = pairs(A + x+ z) = pairs(A + z).
Therefore
f(pairs(A+x+z))−f(pairs(A+z)) = 0 = f(pairs(A+x+y))−f(pairs(A+y))
and again v(A+ x+ z)− v(A+ z) ≥ v(A+ x+ y)− v(A+ y).
If A has more items of the type of z we must distinguish two cases. On
one hand, if A has one more item of the type of z than of type y then
pairs(A) + 1 = pairs(A+ x+ y) = pairs(A+ x+ z) = pairs(A+ y)
and
pairs(A) = pairs(A+ z)
Therefore v(A+ x+ z)− v(A+ z) > 0 = v(A+ x+ y)− v(A+ y). On
the other hand if A has at least two more items of type z than of type x
then
pairs(A) + 2 = pairs(A+ x+ y),
pairs(A) + 1 = pairs(A + y) = pairs(A+ x+ z)
and
pairs(A) = pairs(A+ z).
Let k = pairs(A) + 1. We have
f(pairs(A+ x+ z))− f(pairs(A+ z)) = f(k)− f(k − 1) ≥
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f(k + 1)− f(k) = f(pairs(A+ x+ y))− f(pairs(A+ y)).
and again v(A+ x+ z)− v(A+ z) ≥ v(A+ x+ y)− v(A+ y).
The reader is invited to show that, with respect to the left-right parti-
tion, the valuation v above satisfies the gross substitutes and complements
condition of Sun and Yang [20]. Therefore an economy in which all agents
have such valuations has a Walrasian equilibrium.
The example above concerned with items of two different types cannot be
extended to three types of items: if x, y and z are of pairwise different types
and w is the type of z cw(x, y) > cw(x, z) = cw(y, z) contradicting Ultra.
10 Closure properties
As noticed in Lema 1 if v is an ultra valuation and p is a price vector then
the utility u defined by up(A) = v(A)−
∑
i∈A pi is also an ultra valuation.
In contrast with substitutes valuations, ultra valuations are not closed
under OR (i.e., convolution), as shown below. Let v be defined by v(∅) = 0,
v(x) = 5, v(y) = 10, v(z) = 15, v(xy) = 25, v(xz) = 20, v(yz) = v(xyz) = 35.
Note that c(x, y) = 10, c(y, z) = 10 and c(x, z) = 0. The valuation v satisfies
Ultra and is an ultra valuation. Let u be the symmetric valuation defined
by: 0→ 0, 1→ 6, 2→ 12 and 3→ 12. The valuation u is symmetric and
therefore an ultra valuation. Let w = uORv. We have w(x) = 6, w(y) = 10,
w(z) = 15, w(xy) = 25, w(xz = 21, w(yz) = 35 and c(x, y) = 9, c(y, z) = 10
and c(x, z) = 0, that contradictsUltra and shows w is not an ultra valuation.
Ultra valuations are not closed under XOR either: for u and v as above,
the valuation (u XOR v) is not an ultra valuation.
The sum of different ultra valuations on disjoint sets of items is an ultra
valuation. More precisely if Ω0, . . . ,Ωm is a partition of Ω and if vi is an ultra
valuation on Ωi, the valuation v =
∑m
i=0 vi is an ultra valuation: v satisfies
the Exchange property. The example of Section 9 fits the situation of a
shop selling shoes of only one size and one make, but it can be extended to
a shop selling different makes and sizes. Every pair of left and right shoes
of the same make and the same size has a value that depends on the make
and perhaps the size. The value of a bundle is the sum of the values of the
different bundles of pairs of a specific make and size. This valuation is the
sum of the different ultra valuations on each subdomain defined by a make
and a size and is therefore an ultra valuation.
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Ultra valuations are not closed under the addition of a dummy item to
Ω. A study of the effect of dummy items can be found in Appendix B.
11 A characterization of substitutes valua-
tions
In [19] Theorem 10 establishes that substitutes valuations are exactly those
submodular valuations that satisfy RGP. An alternative proof is proposed
below.
Theorem 3 A valuation v is substitutes iff
1. v is submodular, and
2. v is an ultra valuation.
Proof: Gul and Stacchetti [5] proved that any substitutes valuation is sub-
modular. Lehmann, Lehmann and Nissan [15]’s Claim 1, together with the
folklore remark that the conditional valuation vA is substitutes if v is substi-
tutes, proves that any substitutes valuation is an ultra valuation.
Suppose now that v is a submodular ultra valuation, we want to prove that
it is substitutes. We shall prove that any submodular ultra valuation is M ♮-
concave (see Definition 8 below) and that any such valuation is substitutes.
Murota and Shioura introduced M ♮-concave valuations in [17] in the context
of convex discrete optimization.
Definition 8 A valuation v is said to be M ♮-concave iff for any A,B ⊆ Ω
and any x ∈ A− B one of the two following properties holds:
1. v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A− x) + v(B + x), or
2. there exists some y ∈ B − A such that
v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A− x+ y) + v(B − y + x).
Note the difference with the Exchange property defining ultra valuations:
the condition | A | ≤ | B | is dropped but a second possibility is opened.
The proofs that any submodular ultra valuation is M ♮-concave and that
any M ♮-concave valuation is substitutes appear in Appendix C. The latter is
the easy part of a result of Fujishige and Yang [4] showing that a valuation
is substitutes iff it is M ♮-concave.
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12 Preferred bundles
For substitutes valuations there is an important literature on the relations
between preferred bundles, i.e., on the properties of the demand correspon-
dence, initiated by Gul and Stacchetti [5] and their characterization of sub-
stitutes valuations by the single improvement property that presents the
advantage of not involving prices. Since ultra valuations are not necessarily
substitutes, they do not always satisfy the single improvement property. We
shall propose weaker properties.
For any natural number k ≤ n (n is the size of Ω) we shall call the set
of bundles of size k the k-slice of Ω. A bundle that maximizes a valuation v
among all bundles of the k-slice is called a k-preferred bundle.
Our first result examines the relation between two preferred bundles (in
the same slice or in different slices).
Theorem 4 Let v be an ultra valuation and let A,B ⊆ Ω be bundles of size
k1 and k2 respectively with k1 ≤ k2. Assume further that A is a k1-preferred
bundle and that B is a k2-preferred bundle. If x ∈ A− B then there exists
some y ∈ B − A such that the bundle A− x+ y is a k1-preferred bundle and
B − y + x is a k2-preferred bundle.
Proof: Since | A | ≤ | B | Exchange implies the existence of a y ∈ B − A
such that v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A− x+ y) + v(B − y + x). But, by our as-
sumptions, v(A) ≥ v(A− x+ y) and v(B) ≥ v(B − y + x) and therefore
v(A− x+ y) = v(A) and v(B − y + x) = v(B).
Our next result is the basis for proving the correctness of the greedy
algorithm for finding an optimal bundle.
Theorem 5 Let v be an ultra valuation, 0 < k < n and let A be a k-
preferred bundle. Then
1. there is an item x ∈ Ω−A such that A+x is a k+1-preferred bundle,
and
2. there is an item x ∈ A such that A− x is a k − 1-preferred bundle.
Proof: Let B be one of the k+1-preferred bundles that is closest to A, i.e.,
| B − A | is minimal. If there exists some item x ∈ A− B, then Theorem 4
implies that there is some y ∈ B − A such that B− y+x is a k+1-preferred
bundle. But B − y + x is strictly closer to A than B, contradicting our
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assumption. We conclude that there is no such item x and A ⊆ B. Similarly
for the second claim: if B is one of the k−1-preferred bundles that is closest
to A, there can be no x ∈ B −A and B ⊆ A.
Corollary 1 Let v be an ultra valuation, S a k-preferred bundle and x =
argmaxx∈Ω−Sv(x | S). Then, S + x is a k + 1-preferred bundle.
Proof: By Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 If v is an ultra valuation and A a k-preferred bundle, then
1. for any m, 0 ≤ m < k there is an m-preferred bundle B such that
B ⊂ A, and
2. for any m k < m ≤ n there is an m-preferred bundle B such that
A ⊂ B.
Proof: By a repeated use of Theorem 5.
We shall say that A ⊆ Ω is a preferred bundle (for v) iff it maximizes v
over all bundles, i.e., v(A) ≥ v(B) for any B ⊆ Ω.
Theorem 7 Let v be an ultra valuation and let A,B ⊆ Ω be preferred bun-
dles with k1 = | A | ≤ k2 = | B |. Then,
1. there is a preferred bundle C such that | C |= k1 and C ⊆ B, and
2. there is a preferred bundle D such that | D |= k2 and A ⊆ D,
Proof: By Theorem 6 and the remark that any ki-preferred bundle is a
preferred bundle (i = 1, 2).
13 Item prices
The interest in substitutes valuations has been motivated by their properties
under a change in the prices of the items. We shall now study how preferred
sets of an ultra valuation react to a change in prices. Given a price vector p
a preferred bundle for v under prices p is a preferred bundle for the valuation
up defined by up(A) = v(A)−
∑
x∈A px. We noticed in Section 10 that up is
an ultra valuation if v is. Our first result considers an increase in the price
of a single item.
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Theorem 8 Let v be an ultra valuation, A a bundle of size k and x ∈ A.
Let p a price vector for the items and let p′ be a price vector such that p′y =
py for any y ∈ Ω− {x} and p
′
x ≥ px. If A is a k-preferred bundle at prices
p, then either
1. A is a k-preferred bundle at prices p′, or
2. there is some y ∈ Ω− A such that A− x+ y is a k-preferred bundle at
prices p′.
Proof: When the price of x increases the utility of all bundles containing x
decreases equally, whereas the utility of all bundles not containing x stays
unchanged. Bundle A stays preferred among bundles of size k until its utility
equals that of a bundle of size k that does not contain x. Assume this
happens at prices p0. Since up0 is an ultra valuation, by Theorem 4 there is
a k-preferred bundle of the form A− x+ y for some y ∈ Ω− A. A further
increase in the price of x does not affect the utility of such a bundle that
stays preferred among bundles of size k.
A similar result holds when the price of x decreases. The proof is similar.
Theorem 9 Let v be an ultra valuation, A a bundle of size k and x ∈ Ω− A.
Let p a price vector for items and let p′ be a price vector such that p′y = py
for any y ∈ Ω− {x} and p′x ≤ px. If A is a k- preferred bundle at prices p,
then either
1. A is a k-preferred bundle at prices p′, or
2. there is some y ∈ A such that A− y + x is a k-preferred bundle at
prices p′.
Our next result is concerned with preferred bundles.
Theorem 10 Let v be an ultra valuation, A ⊆ Ω and x ∈ A. Let p a price
vector for items and let p′ be a price vector such that p′y = py for any
y ∈ Ω− {x} and p′x ≥ px. If A is a preferred bundle at prices p, then either
1. A is a preferred bundle at prices p′, or
2. there is no preferred bundle at prices p′ that contains x and there is a
bundle B ⊆ A− x such that either
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(a) B is a preferred bundle at prices p′, or
(b) there is some y ∈ Ω− B, y 6= x such that B + y is a preferred
bundle at prices p′.
Proof: Let | A |= k1. When the price of x increases the utility of all
bundles containing x decreases equally, whereas the utility of all bundles
not containing x stays unchanged. Bundle A stays preferred until its utility
equals that of a bundle X that does not contain x. Let | X |= k2. Assume
this happens at prices p0. If k2 ≥ k1, since up0 is an ultra valuation, by
Theorem 7 there is a preferred bundle Y such that Y ⊆ X and | Y |= | A |.
We see that x ∈ A− Y and by Theorem 4 there is a preferred bundle of the
form A− x+ y for some y ∈ Y − A. Our claim is satisfied with B = A− x.
If k2 < k1, by Theorem 7 there is a preferred bundle of size k2, say Y such
that Y ⊆ A. If x 6∈ Y , we can take B = Y . If x ∈ Y , x ∈ Y −X and by
Theorem 4, since up0 is an ultra valuation, there is a preferred bundle of the
form Y − x+ y for some y ∈ X − Y . We can take B = Y − x.
Note that, if v is substitutes Theorem 10 can be strenghtened by modi-
fying the condition B ⊆ A− x to B = A− x. The difference is due to the
fact that ultra valuations may exhibit complementarity and an increase in
the price of item x may induce an agent to let go of other items that comple-
ment x. Note that, in Theorem 10, the set A− B is a bundle that exhibits
complementarity. A theorem similar to Theorem 10 can be formulated for a
decrease in the price of an item x.
We shall now present a converse to Theorem 5.
Theorem 11 Let v be a valuation that is not an ultra valuation. There is
a price vector p, a number k, 0 < k < n and a k-preferred bundle A under
prices p such that for no item x ∈ Ω− A is A+ x a k + 1-preferred bundle.
Proof: The valuation v does not satisfy Ultra and therefore there is a bun-
dle S and pairwise distinct items x, y and z in Ω− S such that cS(x, y) >
cS(x, z) and cS(x, y) > cS(y, z). We let k = | S | +1. We fix the prices of the
items in S low enough to ensure that any k-preferred and any k+1-preferred
bundles include S. We fix the prices of all items of Ω− S − x− y − z to
values high enough to ensure none of those items are contained in any k-
preferred or k + 1-preferred bundles. We complete the description of our
price schedule by px = v(x | S), py = v(y | S) and pz = v(z | S). We
see that up(S + x) = up(S + y) = up(S + z) = up(S). We notice that
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S + z is a k-preferred bundle under prices p. Let us examine the k + 1
slice. The only candidates to being k + 1-preferred bundles under prices p
are the three sets S + x+ y, S + x+ z and S + y + z. But up(S + x+ y) =
up(S) + cS(x, y) + v(x | S) + v(y | S)− px − py = up(S) + cS(x, y). Similarly
for up(S + x+ z) and up(S + y + z). We see that up(S + x+ y) is strictly
larger than up(S + x+ z) and up(S + y + z). We conclude that S + x+ y is
the only k + 1-preferred bundle and that there is no k + 1-preferred bundle
that extends S + z.
14 Characterization of preferred bundles
We shall characterize preferred and k-preferred bundles of an ultra valuation
and show that any bundle that is, in a sense, locallly preferred is globally
preferred. Our first result deals with k-preferred bundles.
Theorem 12 Let v be an ultra valuation, A ⊆ Ω, k =| A | and assume that
v(A) ≥ v(A− x+ y) for any x ∈ A and any y ∈ Ω− A. Then, A is a k-
preferred bundle.
Proof: Let X be a k-preferred bundle that is closest to A in terms of Ham-
ming distance: the distance between two bundles is the size of their symmet-
ric difference. Suppose there exists some x ∈ A−X . Then, by Exchange,
there exists some y ∈ X −A such that
v(A) + v(X) ≤ v(A− x+ y) + v(X − y + x).
ButX − y + x is strictly closer toA thanX and therefore v(X) > v(X − y + x)
and v(A) < v(A− x+ y), a contradiction. We conclude that there is no such
x and therefore A = X and A is a k-preferred bundle.
Let us now characterize preferred bundles.
Theorem 13 Let v be an ultra valuation. A bundle A ⊆ Ω is a preferred
bundle iff all three conditions below are satisfied:
1. A is a k-preferred bundle for k =| A |,
2. v(A) ≥ v(C) for any bundle C such that A ⊆ C,
3. v(A) ≥ v(C) for any bundle C such that C ⊆ A.
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Combining the previous two theorems one sees that if a bundle is preferred
to all bundles that can be obtained by discarding a single item and acquiring
a single new item, to all bundles that can be obtained by acquiring any
number of new items and to all bundles that can be obtained by discarding
any number of items, then it is a preferred bundle.
Proof: The only if part is obvious. Assume that A satisfies each of the three
conditions above and that B is a preferred bundle that is one of the closest to
A in terms of Hamming distance. Let k = | A |. If | B |> k, by Exchange,
if there is an x ∈ A− B there is a y ∈ B − A such that v(A) + v(B) ≤
v(A− x+ y) + v(B − y + x). But B − y + x is closer to A than B and there-
fore not a preferred bundle and v(B − y + x) < v(B). Therefore v(A) <
v(A− x+ y), a contradiction to our assumption 1. We conclude that there
is no x ∈ A− B, A ⊂ B and, by our assumption 2, v(A) = v(B) and A is
an optimal bundle.
If | B |< k, by Exchange, if there is an x ∈ B − A there is a y ∈ A− B
such that v(B) + v(A) ≤ v(B − x+ y) + v(A− y + x). But B − x+ y is
closer to A than B and therefore not an optimal bundle and v(B − x+ y) <
v(B). Therefore v(A) < v(A− y + x), a contradiction to our assumption 1.
We conclude that there is no x ∈ B − A, B ⊂ A and, by our assumption 3,
v(A) = v(B) and A is an optimal bundle.
If | B |= k, we have v(A) = v(B) by our assumption 1 and A is a pre-
ferred bundle.
If v is substitutes, property 2 can be weakened to v(A) ≥ v(A+ x) for
any x ∈ Ω−A and property 3 can be weakened to v(A) ≥ v(A− x) for any
x ∈ A. The reason a stronger condition is needed when dealing with ultra
valuations is that complementarities may be present. If items a and b are
complementary it may be worthwhile to acquire both a and b even though
the acquisition of any one of them alone is not attractive: A+ a+ b may be
optimal while both A+ a and A+ b are less valuable than A. Similarly, in
a situation where a, b ∈ A, one may lose by letting go any one of them but
may profit from relinquishing both.
Note that Theorem 13 seems to require an exponential number of checks,
for all subsets and supersets of A. Section 15 will present a polynomial time
algorithm to find an optimal bundle.
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15 Searching for a preferred bundle
We consider the task of finding a preferred bundle, i.e., a bundle that maxi-
mizes an ultra valuation v. In [3] the authors show that the greedy algorithm
to be described below finds, in O(n2) steps (n is the size of Ω), a preferred
bundle iff the valuation satisfiesDT. We have shown that this last property is
equivalent to Exchange and this allows for a simple proof of the correctness
of the greedy algorithm.
The greedy algorithm finds a k-preferred bundle, Ak, for every k = 0, . . . , n.
The bundle A0 is ∅. For any k = 0, . . . , n− 1,
Ak+1 = Ak ∪ {argmaxx∈Ω−Akv(x | Ak)}.
Any bundle Al such that v(Al) ≥ v(Ak) for every k = 0, . . . , n is a preferred
bundle by Corollary 1. A failure of the greedy algorithm to find a preferred
bundle for a valuation v implies a failure of Corollary 1 and shows that v is not
an ultra valuation. Therefore ultra valuations are exactly those valuations v
for which the greedy algorithm above finds a preferred bundle for all marginal
valuations vS.
Note that, letting Ak = Ak−1 ∪ {xk} and Ak+1 = Ak ∪ {xk+1} if v is
substitutes, one has
v(Ak+1)− v(Ak) = v(xk+1 | Ak) ≤
v(xk+1 | Ak−1) ≤ v(xk | Ak−1) = v(Ak)− v(Ak−1)
for every k = 1 , . . . , n - 1 and one may stop the search as soon as v(Al+1) ≤
v(Al). It is this shortened version of our greedy algorithm that is shown to
characterize substitutes valuations in [16]. Substitute valuations are exactly
those valuations v for which the shortened greedy algorithm above finds a
preferred bundle for all marginal valuations vS.
16 Competitive equilibrium among ultra agents
We want to consider now the allocation problem among agents that exhibit
ultra valuations. Let J = {0, . . . , m− 1} be a set of m agents. Agent j has
valuation vj. We assume all vj ’s are ultra valuations and want to study the
resulting exchange economy. An allocation is a partition A0, . . . , Am−1 of Ω
in m bundles: bundle Aj is allocated to agent j. Despite the positive results
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presented in Section 15, we do not know of a polynomial time algorithm to
find the allocation to the agents in J that maximizes the social welfare.
We know, from [5], that not all economies vj , j ∈ J of ultra valuations
have a competitive equilibrium. Theorem 14 characterizes competitive equi-
libria among ultra valuations: instead of having to check that an agent’s
utility is a maximum over all bundles, a local search is sufficient: it is enough
to check this for subsets, supersets of the bundle allocated to an agent and
bundles lying at distance 2 from this bundle. As explained in Section 10
the valuation upj denotes the utility of agent j at prices p and is an ultra
valuation.
Note that, if for substitutes valuations an ascending (or descending) auc-
tion as described by [13] or [16] provides a Walrasian equilibrium, this is
not necessarily the case for supra valuations, even if the existence of such an
equilibrium is guaranteed. The reason can be found in Theorem 10: a raise
in the price of item x can lead an agent to let go of some other items in his
or her preferred bundle: this corresponds to the case the bundle B in the
theorem is a strict subset of A−x and, in such a case, an item can find itself
without any agent interested in it.
Theorem 14 A pair (A, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium iff for any agent j
the three following conditions hold:
1. upj(Aj) ≥ u
p
j (C) for any bundle C such that Aj ⊆ C,
2. upj(Aj) ≥ u
p
j (C) for any bundle C such that C ⊆ Aj,
3. upj(Aj) ≥ u
p
j (Aj − x+ y) for any x ∈ Aj and any y ∈ Ω− Aj.
Proof: The only if part follows straightforwardly from the definition of a
Walrasian equilibrium, the if part from Theorem 13.
Theorem 14 implies that, in an economy of ultra valuations in which no
Walrasian equilibrium exists, no transactions based on prices between the
agents can attain an allocation that satisfies the three conditions above.
If there is a Walrasian equilibrium the Linear Program considered in [1]
has an integral solution and it can be computed in polynomial time as ex-
plained in [18]. The hard cases for an allocation algorithm therefore concern
the case the economy has no competitive equilibrium and the Linear Program
has a fractional solution.
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17 Conclusion and open questions
This paper has proposed a novel exchange property that can be defined in
many equivalent but quite different ways, some of them considered earlier in
the extant literature. This exchange property allows for streamlined proofs of
properties of the valuations that satisfy it, the ultra valuations, in particular
Theorem 5 that implies a straightforward, polynomial-time, greedy algorithm
for finding a preferred bundle for an ultra valuation. The complexity of the
problem of finding an optimal allocation is not known. Ultra valuations may
be compared both with substitutes valuations for which both problems of
maximizing a single valuation and of finding an optimal allocation are easy,
and with submodular valuations for which both problems are NP-hard.
Here is a list of intriguing open questions.
• Is the problem of finding an optimal allocation in NP, in P, NP-hard?
• What is the communication complexity of the allocation problem?
• What is the complexity of deciding whether a set of m ultra valuations
admits a competitive equilibrium?
• What is the notion of equilibrium, i.e. the solution concept, that could
fit economies of ultra agents?
• A search for more examples of ultra valuations, in particular real life
valuations, is also worthwhile pursuing.
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A Technical lemmas
Lemma 6 Let v satisfy Ultra and B ⊆ Ω, then the valuation vB satisfies
Ultra.
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Proof: The proof is straightforward if one notices that vBA = vA∪B and
therefore cBA = cA∪B.
Lemma 7 Let v satisfy Ultra and x, y, z ∈ Ω be pairwise distinct items.
One of the two following holds:
1. v(z) + v(x+ y) ≤ v(y) + v(x+ z), or
2. v(z) + v(x+ y) = v(x) + v(y + z).
Note that the consequent is a strengthening of the property RGP described
in Section 7.
Proof: Inequality 1 is equivalent to c(x, y) ≤ c(x, z) and equality 2 is equiv-
alent to c(y, z) = c(x, y). The result follows from the definition ofUltra.
Lemma 8 Let v satisfy Ultra, ∅ 6= A ⊆ Ω and x ∈ Ω− A. Then there is
some y ∈ A such that v(x) + v(A) ≤ v(y) + v(A− y + x).
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on k = | A |. The base case is k = 1
and is obvious. Suppose we have proved our claim for k and let | A |= k + 1.
Let w ∈ A be the item that maximizes the quantity v(A− z)− v(A− z + x)
over z ∈ A. By the induction hypothesis, there is some y ∈ A− w such that
v(x) + v(A− w) ≤ v(y) + v(A− w − y + x)
By Lemma 6 vA−w−y satisfies Ultra and Lemma 7 shows that either
v(A− w − y + x) + v(A) ≤ v(A− y + x) + v(A− w) (4)
or
v(A− w − y + x) + v(A) ≤ v(A− w + x) + v(A− y). (5)
But we have chosen w in such a way that
v(A− w)− v(A− w + x) ≥ v(A− y)− v(A− y + x)
and therefore
v(A− y + x) + v(A− w) ≥ v(A− w + x) + v(A− y).
We conclude that (5) implies (4) and consequently (4) holds. Therefore:
v(x) + v(A) = v(x) + v(A− w) + v(A)− v(A− w) ≤
v(y)+v(A−w−y+x)+v(A−y+x)−v(A−w−y+x) = v(y)+v(A−y+x).
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Lemma 9 Let v satisfies Ultra and w, x, y, z ∈ Ω be pairwise distinct. One
of the two following inequalities holds:
1. c(w, y) + c(x, z) ≤ c(w, x) + c(y, z), or
2. c(w, y) + c(x, z) ≤ c(x, y) + c(w, z).
Proof: If none of the inequalities holds, some term on the left must be
strictly greater than the corresponding term on the right. All such pairs
are the same up to a permutation of the variables, therefore, without loss of
generality we may assume c(w, y) > c(w, x). By Ultra we have:
c(x, y) = c(w, y) > c(w, x).
If c(x, z) ≤ c(w, z) inequality 2 is satisfied. Assume, then, that c(x, z) > c(w, z).
By Ultra we have:
c(x, y) = c(w, y) > c(w, x) = c(x, z) > c(w, z).
Notice that c(w, y) > c(w, z) and therefore, by Ultra, we have:
c(x, y) = c(w, y) = c(y, z) > c(w, x) = c(x, z) > c(w, z)
and inequality 2 is satisfied.
B Dummy items
Let v be a valuation on Ω. When we say that we add a set X , X ∩ Ω = ∅,
of dummy items we mean that we consider the valuation v′ on the set Ω′ =
Ω ∪X defined by v′(A) = v(A ∩ Ω) for any A ⊆ Ω′.
Lemma 10 If v is not submodular then v′ does not satisfy LLN. Therefore
adding dummy items does not preserve ultra valuations.
Proof: Assume v is not submodular. There are A ⊆ Ω and x, y ∈ Ω− A
such that v(x | A+ y) > v(x | A). Let z 6∈ Ω be a dummy element. We
have
v′A(x | y) = v(x | A+ y) > v(x | A) = v
′(x | A+ z) = v′A(x | z).
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But v′A(y | z) = v(y | A), v
′
A(y | x) = v(y | A+ x) and
v(y | A)− v(y | A + x) = v(x | A)− v(x | A+ y) < 0.
But adding dummy items preserve ultra valuations that are submodular.
Lemma 11 If v is a submodular ultra valuation then v′ is a submodular ultra
valuation.
Proof: One easily sees that adding dummy items preserves submodularity.
Suppose v is a submodular ultra valuation, we shall show that v′ satisfies
LLN. Let A ⊆ Ω′ = Ω ∪X , x, y, z ∈ Ω′ pairwise distinct and assume that
v′A(z | x) > v
′
A(z | y). We see that z is not a dummy item: z ∈ Ω. If x is
a dummy item the consequent of LLN holds since v′A(x | y) = v
′
A(x | z) =
0. We may therefore assume now that x ∈ Ω. If y were a dummy item we
would have v′(z | A+ x) = v′A(z | x) > v
′
A(z | y) = v
′(z | A), contradicting
the fact that v′ is submodular. We see that we may assume that x, y, z ∈ Ω.
But, if B = A ∩ Ω, for any a, b ∈ Ω we have v′A(a | b) = vB(a | b) and our
claim follows from the fact that v is an ultra valuation.
C Characterization of substitutes valuations
Theorem 15 Any submodular ultra valuation is M ♮-concave.
Proof: Let v be a submodular ultra valuation, A,B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ A− B. We
must show that either v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A− x) + v(B + x), or there exists
some y ∈ B −A such that v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A− x+ y) + v(B − y + x). If
| A | ≤ | B | the claim follows from the Exchange property of v.
Suppose, then, that | A |> | B |. We shall add dummy items to B in
order to bring it to the size of A. Let k = | A | − | B |> 0. Let X be any
set of k elements such that X ∩ Ω = ∅ and let Ω′ = Ω ∪X and define v′ by
v′(Y ) = v(Y ∩ Ω) for any Y ⊆ Ω′. By Lemma 11, the valuation v′ is an ultra
valuation.
Let now B′ = B ∪X . We have | A | ≤ | B′ | and x ∈ A−B′. By the
Exchange property of v′ there is some y ∈ B′ − A such that v′(A) + v′(B′) ≤
v′(A− x+ y) + v′(B′ − y + x). But v′(A) = v(A) and v′(B′) = v(B). We
distinguish two cases: y is a dummy item or an element of Ω. If y ∈ Ω,
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v′(A− x+ y) = v(A− x+ y) and v′(B′ − y + x) = v(B − y + x) and the
second option of our claim is satisfied. If, on the contrary, y is a dummy item,
y ∈ X, then v′(A− x+ y) = v(A− x) and v′(B′ − y + x) = v(B + x) and
the first option of our claim is satisfied. Note that the submodularity of v is
used only to prove that v′ is an ultra valuation.
We are left to show that any M ♮-concave valuation is substitutes. This
was shown by Fujishige and Yang in [4] but, since they use the language
and techniques of discrete convex optimization an alternative proof is given
below. We shall use the following characterization of substitutes valuations:
Theorem 16 A valuation v is substitutes iff for any vector price p, any
bundles A,B ⊆ Ω both optimal at prices p, any x ∈ A−B, there exists a
bundle C optimal at prices p such that A− {x} ⊆ C and x 6∈ C.
Theorem 17 Any M ♮-concave valuation is substitutes.
Proof: Let p, A, B and x be as assumed and let v be M ♮-concave. For
any bundle X ⊆ Ω, define up(X) = v(X)−
∑
w∈X pw. If v(A) + v(B) ≤
v(A− x) + v(B + x) we have up(A) + up(B) ≤ up(A− x) + up(B + x). But
up(A) ≥ up(A− x) and up(B) ≥ up(B + x). We conclude that up(A) =
up(A− x) and A− x is the bundle C we looked for.
If v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A− x+ y) + v(B − y + x) for some y ∈ B − A we
have up(A) + up(B) ≤ up(A− x+ y) + up(B − y + x). But we have up(A) ≥
up(A− x+ y) and up(B) ≥ up(B − y + x). We conclude that up(A) =
up(A− x+ y) and A− x+ y is the bundle C we looked for.
D Choice-language definition of substitutabil-
ity
In [11] Hatfield and Milgrom proposed a definition of substitutability in terms
of the relation between the subsets of choice among a set of possibilities and
among a larger set of possibilities. Their definition, intuitively, states that a
valuation v is substitutes iff for any bundles X ⊆ Y ⊆ Ω and for any bundle
A ⊆ X that maximizes v among all subsets of X and any bundle B ⊆ Y that
maximizes v among all bundles of Y , every item x of B that happens to be
an item of X is already in A: B ∩X ⊆ A.
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The intuitive description above needs to be carefully formalized if one
wants to pay attention to situations in which the maximizing bundle is not
unique. The authors above, to avoid, this problem, treat only the case where
there is a unique maximizing bundle, which is enough since this is the generic
case.
Theorem 18 formalizes a definition in the style of Hatfield and Milgrom in
the general case, where ties are permitted, and characterizes the valuations
it defines.
Theorem 18 The three following properties of a valuation v are equivalent:
1. v is substitutes,
2. for any additive valuation p, X ⊆ Y ⊆ Ω and for any B ⊆ Y that max-
imizes vp over all subsets of Y , there is an A ⊆ X that maximizes vp
over all subsets of X such that B ∩X ⊆ A,
3. for any additive valuation p, X ⊆ Y ⊆ Ω and for any A ⊆ X that max-
imizes vp over all subsets of X, there is a B ⊆ Y that maximizes vp
over all subsets of Y such that B ∩X ⊆ A.
Proof: To show that 1 implies 2 one uses the properties of the substitutes
valuation v under rising prices. Begin with the prices given by p for all items
of Y and very high prices for items in Ω− Y . Then raise the prices of all
items in Y −X to a very high price.
To show that 1 implies 3 one uses the properties of a substitutes valuation
under decreasing prices. Begin with the prices given by p for all items of X
and very high prices for items in Ω−X . Then decrease the prices of all items
in Y −X to their price in p.
Let us assume 2 or 3. First, we shall show that v is submodular. If
A ⊆ B ⊆ Ω, x ∈ Ω−B and v(x | B) > v(x | A), we choose a price px for
x such that v(x | B) > px > v(x | A). For any item in B, choose a very
low price (may be negative). One sees that B ∪ {x} is the unique bundle
that maximizes vp among all subsets of B ∪ {x} and A is the only bundle
that maximizes vp among all subsets of A ∪ {x}, contradicting both 2 and 3.
We conclude that v(x | B) ≤ v(x | A) and v is submodular. We shall now
show that v satisfies LLN, but note we shall use submodularity. Assume
that LLN does not hold: vS(z | x) > vS(z | y) and vS(x | y) < vS(x | z).
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We shall show that 3 does not hold. Let us give very low prices to all items
in S and fix prices for x, y and z such that:
vS(x | z) > px > vS(x | y), vS(z | x) > pz > vS(z | y),
vS(y)− vS(x) + px > py > vS(y)− vS({x, z}) + px + pz.
This is indeed possible since pz < vS(z | x) = vS({x, z})− vS(x). Treating
each inequality in turn, and using the fact v is submodular we get:
v
p
S(z) < v
p
S({x, z}), v
p
S(∅) < v
p
S(x), v
p
S({x, y}) < v
p
S(y), v
p
S(x) < v
p
S({x, z}),
v
p
S(∅) < v
p
S(z), v
p
S({y, z}) < v
p
S(y), v
p
S(x) < v
p
S(y), v
p
S(y) < v
p
S({x, z}).
We see that the bundle S ∪ {y} is the only bundle that maximizes vp among
all subsets of S ∪ {x, y} and that S ∪ {x, z}) is the only bundle that max-
imizes vp among all subsets of S ∪ {x, y, z}, a contradiction to both 3 and
2. We conclude that v satisfies LLN. By Theorem 2 it is an ultra valuation.
Since we have shown v is submodular we conclude that it is substitutes by
Theorem 3.
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